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STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Petitioner seeks review of the Industrial Commission of Utah's
order denying Petitioner's Motion for Review dated July 26, 1993.
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant
to §§ 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, 63-46b-16, and 78-2a-3, Utah Code
Ann.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

1.

Whether the Industrial Commission of Utah erred in

finding no causation between Claimant's surgery on July 27, 1989
and an industrial accident on September 15, 1982?

The standard of

appellate review: this Court will not change a factual finding
unless it is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in
light of the whole record before the Court.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-

46b-16(4)(g) (1989); Tasters, Ltd. v. Dep't of Employment Sec. 819
P.2d 361 (Utah App. 1991); Willardson v. Industrial Commfnr 856
P.2d 371 (Utah App. 1993).
2.

Whether the Industrial Commission erred in finding that

Applicant's 1988 injuries were the result of unusual and
extraordinary exertion in moving heavy objects?

The standard of

appellate review: this Court will not change a factual finding
unless it is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in
light of the whole record before the Court.

1

Utah Code Ann. § 63-

46b-16(4)(g); Tasters, Ltd, v. Pep'* of Employment S e c . 819 P.2d
361; Willardson v. Industrial Comm'nr 856 P.2d 371.
3.

Whether there was any material doubt respecting the

Claimant's right to compensation?

The standard of appellate

review: this Court will not change a factual finding unless it is
not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the
whole record before the Court.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g);

Tasters. Ltd. v, Dep't of Employment Sec,f 819 P.2d 361; Willardson
v. Industrial Comm'n, 856 P.2d 371.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. RULES. AND REGULATIONS

None.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Claimant injured his back in an industrial accident on
September 15, 1982 while employed by R.P. Scherer Corporation.
at 1 and 96.)

(R.

Back surgery was performed by Dr. Kirkpatrick a

short time later in 1982.

(R. at 2, 5, and 96.) Claimant suffered

a back strain in an industrial accident on June 11, 1985 while
employed by Salt Lake County.

(R. at 1 and 96.)

Applicant filed claims before the Industrial Commission of
Utah for the back injuries, a medical panel was convened, and the
panel's determination that Claimant had a 15% permanent impairment
of from the 1982 injury was adopted by the Commission.
medical panel found no evidence of a herniated disc.
2

The 1987
The

Commission further found that Applicant was medically stable as of
June 11, 1986.

(R. at 1, 96, and 101.)

Claimant was diagnosed with a low threshold for back pain from
lumbar strain, nervous tension, and obesity.

(R. at 101.)

Claimant knew the probability of further back injury from moving
heavy objects because his 1982 industrial injury occurred while
moving heavy items.

(R. at 101.)

During 1988, the Applicant suffered back pain after lifting
boxes for his mother and the pain continued until a more "serious
episode of painH after he was cleaning his yard.

(R. at

206-207

and 209.)
On July 21, 1988, Claimant was moving a concrete block of the
type used as barriers in parking lots while cleaning up his yard.
Applicant had a bar under the cement barrier and, with his two
sons, "scooted it over out of the way so he could use his parking
space."

Claimant noticed that his back "started hurting pretty

bad" and went to the hospital emergency room. (R. at 6, 208-209,
and 264.)
The Applicant's first examination after the July 21 accident
was the next day at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center on July 22,
1988.

(R. at 6 and 264.) The Emergency Center physician, Dr.

Keith Hooker, reported that Claimant "has had no pain in the last
several months, maybe up to a year and a half."
3

(R. at 6 and 264.)

Dr. Hooker explained that Applicant was injured when "[h]e was
lifting a cement slab for somebody yesterday and now has pain down
the left hip, lumbosacral area and the buttock.

Doesn't really

truly radiate as it did when he had his disc, he states."
and 264.)

(R. at 6

Dr. Hooker examined Claimant for back pain on or about

July 28 and August 1, 1988. Dr. Hooker was suspicious of
Applicant's use of Percodan and referred him for a CT scan.

(R. at

5.)
On August 2, 1988, Dr. Charles Smith first examined Applicant
and reported that Claimant's "present episode occurred while
cleaning up around his apartment doing some furniture moving, etc."
(R. at 11 and 265.) Dr. Smith ordered a CT scan of the lumbar
spine which was performed at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center
and showed a bulging disc and focal herniated disc at L5-S1.
at 10, 11, 15, 260, and 266.)

(R.

In the next examination on August 9,

1988, Dr. Smith described Claimant's medical history in more
detail:
A CT scan done in 1985 revealed a bulging disc but no evidence
of focal herniation. His present herniation occurred while
apparently working around the house, pushing or pulling, no
significant lifting. It appeared to be secondary to the
activities of associated daily living. The patient pushed one
piece of cement out of the way in conjunction with several.
other people.
(R. at 10 and 263.)

4

In a letter dated October 14, 1988s from Dr. Smith to the
Division of Health Care Financing, Dr. Smith stated that "having
reviewed the patient's history, this appears to be secondary to the
original problem!,]M but a "second opinion referral of the patient
will be made....M

(R. at 9 and 251.)

On October 26, 1988, Claimant was examined by Dr. Creig
MacArthur for a second opinion concerning Applicant's low back and
left leg pain.

(R. at 248.) Dr. MacArthur stated that Applicant

had Hdone reasonably well until just recently, more particularly in
July when, about the 26th, he had a recurrence of his symptoms
subsequent to a moving-type of injury when he was moving heavy
objects about."

(R. at 248.)

Dr. Smith's pre-operatlve report entitled History and Physical
stated that Applicant did "reasonably well in the interval" after
his 1982 surgery "until 1988 in July when he was doing a lot of
moving of boxes and so on when they were moving from one site to
another.

The combination of lifting and twisting with repetitive

bending apparently was the underlying cause for the problem."

(R.

at 245.)
Applicant's second back surgery was performed by Dr. Smith on
July 27, 1989.

(R. at 2, 246-247, and 273.)

Following the 1989

surgery, Dr. Smith concluded that Claimant had a 14% rating for the
permanent impairment to Applicant's back.
5

(R. at 2 and 3.)

Neither party requested a medical panel and Applicant
expressly disavowed a panel claiming that none was required-

(R.

at 97 and 99-)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

The 1988 injuries were not the natural result of the

compensable primary injury, since the causative chain between the
original and subsequent injuries was broken by Applicant's exertion
lifting boxes and cement barriers.

The progression of a back

injury remains compensable as long as the worsening is not shown to
have been produced by an independent, nonindustrial cause.

Unlike

instances where a sneeze or picking up a four month-old baby were
not conduct that constituted an independent, intervening cause, all
Applicant's physicians reported that Claimant did reasonably well
for a long period of time before he was injured while moving heavy
objects in 1988.
II.

The ALJ and Commission found that Applicant's efforts in

lifting boxes and concrete barriers were not common, day-to-day,
and ordinary activities.

Claimant's exertion was found to be

unusual and extraordinary to distinguish the authority which
provides that the causation between an original injury and later
medical complications may be broken by an employee's independent,
intervening conduct.

6

111. Applicant was paid all available workers9 compensation
benefits following the 1982 industrial injury.

Claimant argues

that reasonable doubt respecting Claimantvs right to compensation
for the injury should be resolved in his favort

However, this rule

of construction is inapplicable to an attempt to reopen a claim and
recover additional benefits for a subsequent nonindustrial injury.
Applicant alleges that there are doubts respecting Applicant's
right to compensation, but these doubts are based on speculation
and inadmissable evidence.
ARGUMENT I
NO CREDIBLE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT CLAIMANT'S
1989 SURGERY WAS THE DIRECT AND NATURAL
RESULT OF THE ORIGINAL 1982 INDUSTRIAL INJURY
The direct cause of Applicant's 1988 injury was the exertion
of lifting boxes and a cement parking barrier the day before
Claimant was examined at the emergency room.

The emergency room

physician, Dr. Hooker, reported that a day earlier Claimant had
lifted a cement slab resulting in back pain and that the patient
had not experienced back pain for as long as 1% years before the
examination.

This is consistent with the medical evidence that

Applicant was stable by 1986. More than six years elapsed from the
time of the 1982 back surgery, caused by a compensable industrial
injury at R.P. Scherer, and the nonindustrial injuries while
lifting heavy objects during 1988.
7

In Mountain States Casing Servs. v. McKeanr 706 P.2d 601 (Utah
1985), the claimant's arm was severed and reattached after an
industrial accident.

The injured worker's hand sensations had

grown back gradually-and he was advised to continue to use his hand
to restore use.

The applicant sought payment of medical expenses

for subsequent treatment of burns on his hand resulting from use in
daily activities.

Payment of medical expenses was denied on the

grounds that the burns were unrelated to the original accident.
The court held that H[a] subsequent injury is compensable if it is
found to be a natural result of a compensable primary injury." Id.
at 602.

In particular, the court explained that the injured worker

was "not required to show that his original tragedy was the sole
cause of a subsequent injury, but only that the initial workrelated accident was a contributing cause of his subsequent hand
injury." Id.

(citations omitted).

The court concluded that the

burns to the worker's hand were a natural consequence of his
industrial injury, since "the chain of causation between the first
and second injuries" was not broken by his activities.

Id.

at 602-

03.
in intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Board of Review, 839
P.2d 841 (Utah App. 1992), the court relied on the holding in
McKean and other authority for a more precise definition of the
"compensability test."

Claimant injured her back while lifting at

8

work.

Two years later, Applicant attempted to lift her four month-

old grandchild from a baby walker when she suffered another back
injury that required surgery.

Applicant filed a claim for medical

and disability benefits and a medical panel was convened by the
Industrial Commission.

The Commission adopted the determination of

the panel that the surgery was 70% the result of the industrial
injury and 30% the result of the incident lifting the grandchild.
The court noted that the ALJ relied on the medical conclusion of
the panel and then applied the "compensability test" described by
Professor Larson in his treatise.

"The applicable test includes an

analysis of the facts surrounding the subsequent injury and an
analysis of the connection between the subsequent injury and the
original compensable industrial injury. Id.

(relying on 1 Larson,

Workmenfs Compensation Law, § 13.11(a) (1992)).

The court

characterized that ALJfs application of the compensability test as
the determination of a factual circumstance surrounding an
industrial injury that must be ruled on by the ALJ. Id.
Professor Larson distinguishes the causation rules for primary
injuries and for the range of compensable consequences from the
original injury.

The causation rules for primary injuries are the

standard issues of legal and medical causation:

whether the Injury

arose out of or in the course of employment and was a result of
exertion during work-related activity.

9

Allen v. Industrial Comm'n.

729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986).

However, "when the question is whether

compensability should be extended to a subsequent injury or
aggravation related in some way to the primary injury, the rules
that come into play are essentially based upon the concepts <&*'direct and natural results,9 and of claimant's own conduct as an
independent intervening cause."

1 Larson, §13.11 at 3-154.

Claimant argues that the threshold issue is proof of legal and
medical causation.

By contrast, Utah case law and the leading

commentator describe the differing causation rules for the range of
compensable consequences from a primary injury, especially medical
complications following an initial injury.

In this claim, there is

absolutely no dispute that the Applicant's exertion while moving
heavy objects in 1988 was nonindustrial and did not arise in the
course of employment or occur during work-related exertion.
The direct and natural results rule involves two broad classes
of claims.

First, are cases where "an initial medical condition

itself progresses into complications more serious than the original
injury; the added complications are of course compensable."
Larson, § 13.11(a) at 3-155.

1

The second group of medical-causation

claims are those where an independent medical condition is
exacerbated by a compensable injury.

The present claim is

contained in the former classification and Professor Larson
specifically discusses back injuries.
10

In particular, "once the

work-connected character of any injury, such as a back injury, has
been established, the subsequent progression of that condition
remains compensable so long as the worsening is not shown to have
been produced by an independent, nonindustrial cause." 1 Larson, §
13.11(a) at 3-156.

Indeed, the paradigmatic case described by

Professor Larson is Perchelli v. Industrial Commfnr 25 Utah 2d 58,
475 P.2d 835 (1970).
In Perchelli and in the present appeal, the claimant suffered
a back injury while engaged in nonemployment activities. The
difference between this claim and Perchelli is that the claimant in
Perchelli was hardly engaged in any exertion at the time of the
subsequent injury, since the applicant was at home on a Sunday
morning combing his hair when he sneezed and herniated a disc. The
medical testimony was that the original back injury would have
eventually required surgery regardless of the exertion.

Thus, the

court reversed the decision of the Commission that the sneeze was
the independent cause of the applicant's disability and Professor
Larson characterizes this result as "clearly correct.H
13.11(a) at 3-158.

1 Larson §

Professor Larson concluded as follows:

The presence of the sneezing incident should not obscure
the true nature cf the case, which is nothing more than
that of a further medical complication flowing from a
compensable injury. If the herniation had occurred while
claimant was asleep in bed, his characterization as a
mere sequel to the compensable injury would have seemed
obvious. The case should be no different if the
triggering episode is some non-employment exertion like
11

raising a window or hanging up a suit, so long as it is
clear that the real operative factor is the progression
of the compensable injury, associated with an exertion
that in itself would not be unreasonable in the
circumstances.
§ 13.11(a) at 3-158.
The primary issue on this appeal is whether Claimant's
original, compensable back injury directly and naturally progressed
for six years into a more serious injury that required surgery in
1989.

This dispute was resolved by the Commission under the range

of compensable consequences causation rules, not the primary
causation rules.
The overwhelming evidence from the three physicians shows that
the 1988 nonindustrial injuries were not caused by the 1982
industrial accident.

Applicant argues that selected portions of

the medical records suggest that Claimant's own conduct was not the
independent intervening cause of the 1988 nonindustrial injury.
However, "[t]he ALJ has a responsibility to resolve factual
conflicts." Willarflson v, Industrial Comm'n, 856 P.2d at 375
(citing Lancaster v. Gilbert Pev,, 736 P.2d 237 (Utah 1987)).
Moreover, this supposed factual dispute concerning whether
Claimant's 1988 back injuries were caused by the direct progression
of the industrial injury six years earlier is unsupported by the
medical records.

12

In 1988, Dr. Hooker was the first physician to treat Applicant
following the nonlndustrlal accidents.

Dr. Hooker reported that a

day earlier Claimant had lifted a cement slab and now had back
pain.

Dr. Hooker noted that Applicant had not had back pain for as

long as 1% years.

Dr. Hooker examined Applicant three times and

referred the patient for a CT scan.

The CT scan showed a bulging

and a focal herniated disc in the lumbosacral spine.

The prior CT

scan before the 1988 nonlndustrlal accidents only showed a bulging
disc in the lumbosacral spine.
Dr. Smith next treated Claimant and likewise reported that he
had done reasonably well until the 1988 injuries.

Dr. Smith had

several versions of the cause of Applicant's herniation.
Initially, the injury was described as the result of cleaning up
the house and moving furniture.

Next, the back pain followed work

around the house and pushing or pulling a piece of cement with
several other people.

Last, moving a lot of boxes and the

combination of lifting and twisting with repetitive bending was
said to be the underlying cause of the herniation.

Dr. Smith

referred Claimant to Dr. MacArthur for a second opinion.
Similarly, Dr. MacArthur reported that Applicant had done well
until July 1988 when back pain reoccurred after Claimant had been
moving heavy objects about.

13

There is no dispute among the three physicians that Applicant
was largely pain-free for several years before the 1988 lifting
accidents, the industrial injury was six years before the 1988
accidents, there was no herniation during the si& .years prior to
1988, there was no medical treatment for back pain for many years
before 1988, and Claimant sought emergency medical care the day
after moving a concrete barrier.

The lack of medical care before

1988 is more significant where Applicant had a diagnosed low
threshold for back pain from lumbar strain, nervous tension and
obesity.

These facts are sufficient to support the findings of the

ALJ and Commission that the 1988 injuries and surgery were not the
direct and natural consequence of the 1982 industrial injury.
The ALJ and Commission found Applicant's testimony
inconsistent concerning the exertion that preceded the 1988
injuries.

Specifically, Claimant claimed he was very careful when

lifting boxes and minimized the amount of effort used to move the
concrete parking barrier.

Claimant knew the probability of a

herniation if he lifted heavy objects, especially where he had a
substantial permanent impairment to his lumbosacral spine from the
1982 injury*

The ALJ found that physicians must rely on patients

for an accurate history and all three doctors reported that
Applicant was injured while moving heavy objects.

Moreover, the

most reliable report of the accident from the patient would be the
14

history taken closest to the day of the injuries.

The emergency

room doctor noted that Claimant had injured his back lifting a
cement slab one day earlier.
Therefore, there is no credible evidence that Applicant's 1988
back injuries were the direct and natural result of the original
1982 compensable industrial injury.
ARGUMENT II
CLAIMANT'S 1988 INJURIES WERE THE RESULT OF HIS OWN
INDEPENDENT, INTERVENING CONDUCT IN LIFTING HEAVY OBJECTS
Applicant argues that the Commission erroneously concluded
that the exertion necessary to move the concrete parking barrier
was unusual and extraordinary within the meaning of Allen v.
Industrial Comm'n, However, the findings by the ALJ and Commission
that Claimant's efforts to move heavy objects in 1988 were unusual
and extraordinary met the direct and natural results test of

Mountain States Casing Servs, v. McKean, not the legal-cause
requirement for the primary injury in 1982.

In the findings of

fact, the ALJ explicitly distinguished the Intermountain Health
£a££ opinion from this claim, since lifting boxes and concrete
barriers were not common, day-to-day, and ordinary.

Specifically,

the ALJ found that in I.H.C. the subsequent nonindustrial injury
occurred during a common and ordinary activity, since lifting a
four month-old baby out of a walker should not have required
extraordinary effort.

Conversely, Applicant's activities lifting
15

boxes and moving concrete barriers were held to require unusual and
extraordinary exertion.

In particular, the factual findings were

that concrete barriers are heavy, difficult to move, and the mere
fact that three family members were required to move the concrete
block left little doubt that it was not an object that could be
moved with moderate effort.

The ALJ noted that the records of Drs.

Smith and MacArthur showed Claimant did reasonably well until the
strenuous exertion of lifting in 1988 reinjured his lumbosacral
spine.
The ALJ and Commission ruled that the causative chain between
the 1982 surgery and the 1988 herniation cannot be broken by
ordinary, nonstrenuous, day-to-day activities.

The direct and

natural results doctrine provides that the causation between an
original injury and later medical complications is broken by an
employee's independent, intervening conduct.

The I.H.C. and

Perchelli cases and Professor Larson agree that intentional or
negligent conduct by a claimant will break the chain of causation.
In this claim, Applicant had a permanent impairment caused by
a lifting injury and was well aware of the probability of reinjury
from lifting heavy objects.

Claimant's 1988 injuries were not the

result of a natural progression that became symptomatic after
sneezing or attempting to pick up a four month-old baby.

In 1988,

Claimant knowingly and willingly exceeded the physical limitations
16

inherent in a 15% permanent impairment of the low back by activity
which was unusual and extraordinary.
Applicant claims that the terms "unusual and extraordinary"
used by the Commission do not refer to exertion, but only mean that
few of us ever attempt to move a concrete barrier.

In addition,

Claimant asserts that there is no evidence in the record as to the
weight of the concrete block.

However, Applicant's failure to

offer testimony at the hearing to describe the weight of the
parking barrier does not entitle Claimant to argue on appeal that
he was engaged in normal activities or did not exceed his physical
restrictions.

Applicant must prove his claim by a preponderance of

medical evidence.
376.

Willardson v. Industrial CQmm'n, 856 P.2d at

Finally, the allegation by counsel for the Applicant that he

was able to move a parking barrier in his office parking was not
offered at the hearing, where it would have been inadmissible, and
is improper argument on appeal.
Therefore, the finding by the ALJ and Commission that
Claimant's knowing and intentional efforts to lift boxes and move
parking blocks required uncommon and extraordinary exertion was
supported by the evidence.

Applicant's lifting and moving of boxes

and barriers was unusual and extraordinarily strenuous activity
which broke the chain of causation and were deemed independent and
intervening causes by the ALJ and Commission.
17

ARGUMENT III

THERE WAS NO REASONABLE DOUBT RESPECTING
CLAIMANT'S RIGHT TO COMPENSATION FOR THE 1982 INJURY
Defendants do not dispute that the Workers' Compensation Act
should be liberally construed in favor of an award of compensation
where there is reasonable doubt.

However, in this claim, there is

no doubt that Applicant was paid full workers1 compensation
benefits after the 1982 industrial injury.

Applicant has already

received all medical expenses and disability benefits from the
original injury at R.P. Scherer in 1982. Claimant was not
medically stable until 1986.

Thus, Defendants paid medical

expenses and compensation until four years after the compensable
injury.

Presumably, any doubt for full workers' compensation

benefits was resolved in Applicant's favor from 1982 through 1987.
Defendants do not agree that Applicant is entitled to a
liberal construction of any doubt in his favor where he attempts to
reopen his original claim to recover additional compensation for a
nonindustrial injury six years later.

In the McKeanf I.H.C.r and

Perchelli decisions and in § 13 of Professor Larson's treatise,
there is no mention of a rule of construction which requires any
doubt to be construed in favor, of a finding that a subsequent
nonindustrial injury was the direct and natural result of the
original industrial injury.

Claimant seeks to use a well-settled

18

rule of construction as a subterfuge to overlook the undisputed
evidence that moving heavy objects caused the 1988 injuries.
The rule of construction requires reasonable and material
doubt respecting Applicant's right to compensation.

Claimant

asserts doubts based on speculation and inadmissible evidence. For
example, Applicant's counsel refers to tests of the exertion needed
to move a parking barrier performed in his office parking lot after
the filing of this appeal. Additionally, Claimant cites to "PostIt Notes'* in the record on appeal that allegedly support improper
influence, bias, or prejudice of an unidentified ALJ.

The Post-It

Notes are inadmissible on appeal, since they were not admitted at
the hearing, were not authenticated, lack foundation and constitute
hearsay.

Finally, Applicant speculates that Dr. MacArthur agreed

with the opinion of the Division of Health Care Financing that the
1988 injuries were secondary to the 1982 injury.

There is no

evidence to support this allegation and Dr. MacArthur's opinion is
nothing but rank supposition.
CONCLUSION
Applicant's uncommon and extraordinary activities break the
chain of causation between the original compensable industrial
injury in 1982 and the nonindustrial injuries in 1988. Applicant
failed to show that the 1988 injuries were a direct and natural
consequence of the primary injury in 1982. All three physicians
19

agreed in the medical records that the 1988 injuries were caused by
independent, nonindustrial lifting of boxes and concrete barriers.
No doctor stated that Applicant's bulging disc naturally progressed
into a herniated disc.

Claimant was largely pain-free for a number

of years before the 1988 lifting accidents, the original injury was
six years before the nonindustrial accident, there was no
herniation until the strenuous exertion during 1988, and Applicant
sought emergency medical care the day after moving a concrete
barrier.

The ALJ and Commission found that Applicant's activities

were unusual and extraordinary to distinguish mere medical
complications of an original injury that arise during normal, dayto-day activities such as sneezing or lifting a four month-old
baby.
Finally, all doubts respecting Claimant's rights to full
compensation for the 1982 injury were resolved in his favor.

There

may be doubts concerning Claimant's right to recover under the
direct and natural results rule for the nonindustrial accident six
years later, but they are not reasonable and are based on
speculation and inadmissible evidence.
Therefore, Defendants request that the Applicant's appeal be
dismissed and the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order
of the ALJ and Commission be affirmed.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

i£

day of February, 1995

J. V^hgus ^Edwards
PURSER & EDWARDS, L.L.C.
39 Market Street, Third Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2104
Attorneys for Respondents
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I hereby certify that on this
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day of February, 1995, I

caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
RESPONDENTS, to be deposited in the U.S. mails, postage prepaid,
addressed to the following:
Jay A. Meservy
1610 South Main, Suite E
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Industrial Commission of Utah
Legal Division
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor
P.O. Box 146600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6600
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